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UNRAVELING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE:
FROM LEON TO HERRING TO ROBINSON—AND BACK?
*

David H. Kaye

The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule began to unravel in United States
v. Leon. The facts were compelling. Why exclude reliable physical evidence from
trial when it was not the constable who blundered, but “a detached and neutral
magistrate” who misjudged whether probable cause was present and issued a search
warrant? Later cases applied the exception for “good faith” mistakes to a police officer
who, pursuing a grudge against a suspect, arrested and searched him and his truck on
the basis of a false and negligent report from a clerk in another county of an outstanding
arrest warrant. The California Supreme Court recently applied this line of cases in
People v. Robinson to support the conviction of a man whose DNA was taken by
correctional officials who misunderstood the scope of the state’s DNA database
statute. This Essay shows how the Robinson court exceeded the boundaries of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s good-faith exception. It then proposes several ways to modify
or confine the exception to achieve better protection of the Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

In a case that has attracted surprisingly little commentary, the
California Supreme Court wrote the first reported opinion in the nation
that declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence (presumably)
acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a police agency
relying on its own, mistaken information.1 The case in question is People
v. Robinson.2 At first blush, a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases spanning
the last twenty-five years might seem to make Robinson’s rejection of the
exclusionary rule inevitable. But this impression is mistaken.
In 1984, the Supreme Court loosened a thread in the protective
fabric of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. United States v. Leon3
*
Distinguished Professor and Weiss Family Scholar, Penn State University School of Law and
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of this Essay.
1.
The exclusionary rule generally precludes admitting trial evidence acquired in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
2.
224 P.3d 55 (Cal. 2010).
3.
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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announced a “good-faith” exception for “reliable physical evidence
seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate.”4 Later cases unraveled the rule a bit more. In 1987,
Illinois v. Krull5 applied Leon’s exception to a police officer’s reliance on
an unconstitutional state statute that authorized the warrantless seizure
of evidence from an automobile wrecking yard. In 1995, Arizona v.
Evans6 applied the exception to a police officer’s arrest of a driver based
on a false report of an outstanding arrest warrant transmitted from a court
database. Most recently, in 2009, Herring v. United States7 stretched the
exception slightly more to reach reliance on a false report of an
outstanding warrant from a police clerk in a separate county. And more
ominously for the integrity of the rule, the Court defined Leon’s “reasonable reliance”8 to amount to anything short of systematic and recurring
negligence.9 In sum, Leon and its progeny stand for the proposition that
police acting in “good faith”10—broadly construed—may rely on information or apparent authority supplied by courts, legislatures, and other
police agencies without triggering the exclusionary rule for Fourth
Amendment violations.
In the wake of Herring, the California Supreme Court tugged—
unanimously and sharply—at this weakened structure. When California’s
DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 199811
went into effect, Paul Eugene Robinson “was in custody at [a detention
center] for two misdemeanor convictions and awaiting transfer to state
prison based on a parole revocation [for a] burglary.”12 Although
Robinson’s crimes did not qualify him for inclusion in the new database
for convicted offenders, “an unknown person in the Center’s records
department . . . mistakenly identified [him] as a prisoner with a qualifying
offense . . . . As a result of that mistake, a [blood] sample . . . was

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 913.
480 U.S. 340 (1987).
514 U.S. 1 (1995).
129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701, 704.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 924, 925.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 295–300 (1999).
People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 63 (Cal. 2010).

Unraveling the Exclusionary Rule

209

drawn . . . .”13 The California Department of Justice laboratory analyzed
the sample, uploaded the DNA profile, and got a cold hit to the man
wanted on a “John Doe” DNA warrant for “five felony sexual offenses, all
perpetrated against Deborah L. on August 25, 1994.”14 A jury convicted Robinson of these offenses.15 The California Court of Appeal
affirmed, and the state supreme court granted review.16
The California Supreme Court held that the arrest warrant was
valid and thus tolled the statute of limitations on rape prosecutions.17 It
held that the erroneous extraction of blood violated state law but not
the Fourth Amendment.18 For good measure, it added that even if
there had been a constitutional violation, it would not have mattered
under the good-faith exception.19
This last dictum is my target here. As indicated above, in the Leon
line of cases the U.S. Supreme Court did not go so far as to approve the
admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a
police agency relying on its own, mistaken information—and for good
reason. When the police department conducting the unreasonable
search or seizure is itself the source of the mistake that appears to justify
the search, it can hardly be said, as the Leon Court did, that “there is no
police illegality and thus nothing to deter.”20 Rather, one must make
the more troubling argument, embraced in Herring, that even though the
exclusionary rule can deter negligent and unconstitutional conduct,
the cost of doing so is too high to pay.
Thus, the Robinson court made no direct mention of Leon, instead
relying largely on the controversial Herring decision.21 In Herring, police
13.
Id. at 64.
14.
Id. at 59, 60.
15.
Id. at 62.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 80.
18.
Id. at 66–67.
19.
Id. at 69–71.
20.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984).
21.
129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A
Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463 (2009); Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the
Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191, 191–92 (2010); George M. Dery,
III, Good Enough for Government Work: The Court’s Dangerous Decision, in Herring v. United States,
to Limit the Exclusionary Rule to Only the Most Culpable Police Behavior, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
1, 27–28 (2009); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest
Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009); The Supreme Court,
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officers arrested and searched Herring and his vehicle, uncovering
contraband and an illegally possessed weapon.22 The officers lacked
probable cause to detain or search Herring until a police clerk in a
neighboring county advised them that a current warrant called for his
arrest.23 However, the police database that the clerk had relied on
reported a warrant when in fact it had been recalled.24 Regarding the
false report as a single act of “nonrecurring and attenuated negligence,”25
a bare majority of the Court held that the application of the exclusionary rule was not warranted.26 Four justices objected that acts of distinct
but cooperating police agencies supplied “no occasion to further erode
the exclusionary rule.”27
Despite the Court’s division in Herring, one thing is clear. In every
Supreme Court case that has treated an officer’s reliance on erroneous
information as grounds for suspending the exclusionary rule, the information has come from an unrelated and apparently reliable governmental
source—a judicial officer (Leon), a legislature whose enactments enjoy
a presumption of constitutionality (Krull), judicial staff (Evans), and a
records clerk at another police department (Herring).28 In these
circumstances, courts may balance “the culpability of the police [against]
the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.”29 Within
these boundaries, ordinary and “isolated negligence” normally is not
enough to warrant exclusion.30
These boundaries should not be expanded. To apply this balancing
test more widely would open every Fourth Amendment violation case
arising from inaccurate information supplied by fellow police officials
to litigation over how the balance should be struck in light of the facts
of each case. Courts would need to draw a difficult line between simple

2008 Term—Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 153 (2009) (discussing possible readings of the
Herring opinion).
22.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 702.
26.
Id. at 704.
27.
Id. at 710 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28.
See supra text accompanying notes 3–10.
29.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
30.
Id.
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negligence and “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct,”31 or
between “isolated” negligence and “recurring or systematic negligence.”32
Police officers could be tempted to avoid the dictates of the Amendment
by dividing up investigations so that each officer can rely on a negligent report from a colleague rather than pursuing the investigations in
a more direct fashion. Even without a conscious strategy of avoidance,
coworkers would have less incentive to avoid supplying mistaken
information that would trigger unconstitutional arrests or searches.33
The resulting regime would benefit neither the public, nor the police,
nor the courts.
Robinson’s theory that a police agency may rely on its own negligence
to avoid the exclusionary rule thus deviates from Herring’s suggestion
that the negligence be not merely “isolated” (itself a contested proposition in Robinson) but “attenuated.”34 As I have emphasized, in
Herring and in every other Supreme Court case applying Leon to admit
evidence, the negligent misstatement was attenuated in the sense that
a police officer reasonably relied on plausible information from an independent government agency.35 In Robinson, however, the correctional
facility misinformed itself.
To allow such unattenuated official
misconduct to escape the exclusionary rule would open the courthouse
door to widespread, negligent police misconduct in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Indeed, Robinson is not the only sign of the general unraveling of
the exclusionary rule that is occurring under Herring. In United States
v. Song Ja Cha,36 for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
assumed that Herring applies to an unreasonably long, warrantless seizure
of a residence to allow officers time to obtain a warrant.37 The circuits

31.
Id. at 702.
32.
Id. at 698, 702.
33.
State v. Handy, No. A-108-09, 2011 WL 1544500, at *7 (N.J. Apr. 26, 2011) (declining
to apply Herring when “suppressing the evidence garnered from this illegal search would have
important deterrent value[ and] would underscore the need for training of officers and dispatchers to
focus on detail”).
34.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
35.
See supra text accompanying notes 3–10, 20.
36.
597 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2010).
37.
The court held that the delay was deliberate and culpable, making the evidence
excludable even under Herring. Id. at 1004–06.
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also are divided over whether the good-faith exception extends to
reliance on Supreme Court case law that later is modified or overruled.38
At least four corrections for this confused state of affairs are
possible. The first is overruling Herring. As Justices Breyer and Souter
emphasized in a separate dissent in Herring, this would reinstate the
easily administered rule that only good-faith reliance by police officers
on the erroneous action of other branches of government can suspend the
exclusionary rule.39 However, it seems improbable that a majority of
the Supreme Court would embrace this position, which it so recently
rejected and to which only the two justices subscribed.
Short of this unlikely step, a second solution would be to keep the
Leon exception within its current confines of reliance by the police on
generally accurate information or judgments from unrelated government
officials. When a group of police officers in the same unit (or units who
are working together as part of a combined investigation or common
task) negligently produce inaccurate information, they should not be
able to claim good-faith reliance—because they did not rely on any
outside information and because they have the ability to control their
own conduct. This different-department rule might seem like a fine
point, but it is a reasonable construction of the references to the
undefined “attenuation” in Herring.40
Although this second strategy of confining a destabilizing case to its
facts, or something close to them, is hardly a novel maneuver, more
minor surgery still could be helpful. The third course of treatment would
allow mistaken information or judgments within the same department
to justify the admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, but it would block Herring’s tolerance of negligent mistakes
as a ground for admission. In same- or related-department situations,
“good faith” should mean that the police took reasonable care to avoid
infringing Fourth Amendment rights. Only if the government shows that
38.
See Ross M. Oklewicz, Comment, Expanding the Scope of the Good-Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule to Include a Law Enforcement Officer’s Reasonable Reliance on Well-Settled Case
Law That Is Subsequently Overruled, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1715, 1732–39 (2010).
39.
129 S. Ct. at 710, 711 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40.
For a more thorough defense of reading Herring narrowly, see Hadar Aviram et al., Moving
Targets: Placing the Good Faith Doctrine in the Context of Fragmented Policing, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
709 (2010).
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it acted prudently rather than carelessly (or worse) should the exclusionary rule be blunted. The Herring Court rejected this demand, but it did
so in the context of an interagency mistake.41 As applied to mistakes
within a single agency, the good-faith standard should not be so toothless.
Finally, the fourth solution to fortify the good-faith standard could
extend the previous suggestion to apply not merely to misinformation
within the same agency, but to all cases of Fourth Amendment violations.
Some judges and commentators have little sympathy for the exclusionary rule and would prefer to enable good-faith violations of the
Constitution without incurring its costs. Even from this perspective,
however, merely discarding the attenuation requirement and applying
Herring’s expansive definition of good faith to every type of case may not
be appropriate. Doing so “would leave most violations of the Fourth
Amendment without a remedy [and] would create a regime in which
courts would make most of their Fourth Amendment rulings in dictum if
they decided Fourth Amendment questions at all.”42 A less drastic
outcome would follow from reexamining Herring’s emphasis on police
culpability. The good faith recognized in Leon as warranting an exception
to the exclusionary rule should mean more than the absence of bad
faith. If the exception is to be applied to all unreasonable searches or
seizures, the state should have to demonstrate that the false information
on which an officer relied was not the product of negligence or other
culpable conduct.
Under any of these approaches, and in contrast to Robinson, a
police agency should not be permitted to escape the century-old rule43
that “forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial”44 by
relying on its own, negligent mistakes. In Robinson, not a single justice
of the California Supreme Court seemed to perceive that the court was
crossing a line rather than routinely applying settled doctrine. This is
not a step that should have been taken blindly or lightly. Exempting
ordinary negligence within a single police agency from the exclusionary
41.
See 129 S. Ct. at 698.
42.
Alschuler, supra note 21, at 463.
43.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see generally Melvyn Zarr, The Supreme
Court’s Long and Perhaps Unnecessary Struggle to Find a Standard of Culpability to Regulate the Federal
Exclusionary Remedy for Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 62 ME. L. REV. 265 (2010).
44.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699.
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rule goes well beyond the good faith reliance on a judicial warrant that
swayed the Court in Leon, and it moves the law dangerously close to a
total unraveling of the exclusionary rule.

